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The achievements in agricultural innovation over the past century have been impressive, supporting large 
increases in agricultural yields and low food prices. Critical to this success has been sustained public 
sector investment combined with a decentralized and competitive research system in the US. Recent 
intellectual property reforms motivated increased private investment, yet the private sector still relies 
upon basic research produced by the public sector. Problems with scientific freedom to operate as well as 
concentration in the agricultural biotechnology industry also emerged due to intellectual property rights. 
For new technologies, the case of agriculture demonstrates that government has an important role in 
antitrust, the effective and efficient regulation of technologies, and in facilitating technology adoption.  
1. Introduction 
  Agricultural production is a highly decentralized and geographically dispersed activity, dependent 
upon a wide variety of technologies applied to a heterogeneous natural resource base that is changing 
over time. Its principal products are necessary inputs into consumer goods essential for life, and 
continuous availability at acceptable quality and price is vital.   
  The history of agricultural innovation is relevant to plans for accelerating energy innovation since 
energy production and use share many of the above characteristics. Many innovative energy technologies 
are becoming more similar to agriculture as they revert from depletable to renewable resource bases. 
Indeed, the principal currently commercialized biofuels technologies involve agricultural production. 
Like agriculture, energy production critically relates to greenhouse gas production. It is widely agreed 
that climate change will have a greater impact on agricultural production than on any other sector, while 
in the energy sector, its effect on investment is already significant.   
  The record of achievement in agricultural innovation over the past century is impressive. Increases 
in agricultural productivity have fueled rates of increase in food supply that outpaced the joint effects of 





and Beintema, 2002). Better nutrition has, in turn, transformed life expectancies, labor productivity, and 
the rate of population growth. Agricultural research activities have spread around the globe with marginal 
social rates of return so high that they strain credulity. Patterns of participation and technology exchange 
demonstrate high interdependence both between countries and along the public-private spectrum (Table 1, 
Wright et al, 2007).  
  Agriculture has a long history of productive public research. Evenson’s 2001 survey of over forty 
studies between 1915-1999 gives a marginal real social rate of return to U.S. public agricultural research 
investments between 45-65 percent.
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Compared to other sectors, agricultural research investments are more geographically dispersed, 
both within the United Stated and globally. Indeed, public investments in agricultural research from 
developing countries have recently overtaken public agricultural investment in developed countries as a 
whole (Wright et al, 2007). The fundamental influence from the natural features of the growth 
environment means that adaptive research is often needed to apply agricultural biotechnological 
innovations in a given local area. The U.S. institutional structure supporting agricultural research reflects 
this reality, employing state and local-level research institutions and experiment stations to meet the needs 
of local farmers. Since the primary benefit of innovation in agriculture is lower food prices, countries 
 The development of an effective system for public investment in 
research and knowledge dissemination critically contributed to the observed pace of agricultural 
advancement. In addition, sharing of knowledge and innovation between farmers, input suppliers, and 
researchers, both within agriculture and beyond, has played an important role. For example, just as 
applied research in electronics, communications and nuclear energy have drawn from basic research 
funded by the U.S. Department of Defense, recent innovations in agricultural biotechnology owe much to 
projects on human health funded by the National Institutes of Health. 
                                                 
1 However, in a meta-analysis of nearly 300 relevant studies (including those derived from U.S. data or 
foreign data), Alston et al (2000) note that the estimates for annual rates of return range from -7.4 to 
5,645 percent. Few studies actually fall into the 45-65 percent category. The authors find significant 
variation in the estimates derives from the different rate of return measures used, potential analyst biases 
and methodologies used, and the type of research evaluated. Alston et al (2000a) instead estimate an 80 





with large populations can internalize a larger share of the gains from more basic research that has strong 
externalities across neighboring environments, Thus, large countries account for a dominant portion of 
public research investments.  
Beginning in the United States in 1980, advances in biotechnology, combined with the extension 
of strong intellectual property (IP) protection to agriculture, have elicited such a great private investment 
response that it now exceeds public investment. The proliferstions of IP, however, has not been without 
consequences. There is mounting evidence of a negative effect on freedom to operate in public sector 
projects directed towards production of plant varieties and other technologies for use by farmers. The 
problem arises from fragmented IP claims to technology inputs and is especially prominent in the 
agricultural biotechnology field. The private sector responded to costly sharing of IP with a series of 
industry purchases, leading to market concentration and the current dominance of the agricultural industry 
by the firm Monsanto. 
   Public interventions with other objectives also affect innovation. Public support for the incomes of 
farmers and other agricultural investors moderates their opposition to policies reducing commodity prices, 
revenues, and, more fundamentally, asset values. Government  regulations regarding food production and 
distribution, employment, environmental protection and intellectual property rights (IPRs) also affect the 
level and distribution of private research and development and technology investments on and off the 
farm, as well as the market structure of input industries.  
  Like the energy sector, the agricultural sector is facing continued challenges posed by a growing 
global population with changing demands on the amounts and kinds of resources being used, and by 
evolving concerns regarding global resources and environmental constraints. Awareness about global 
interdependence of the world’s food supplies has extended to concerns regarding environmental 
externalities such as global warming, motivating international efforts to harmonize regulations and share 
technologies. Recently, concern about food security has engendered a flurry of private investment and 





  In this chapter, we provide an overview of innovation policies for agriculture with the purpose of 
highlighting aspects of interest to the energy sector. We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides a 
summary of global agricultural research investments with particular attention to public versus private 
investments and their distribution between developed and less developed countries. Section 3 provides a 
brief history of U.S. public investment in agriculture. We next discuss the main intellectual property 
mechanisms relevant to agriculture and their effects on research and innovation markets, followed by a 
short discussion of the extent and efficacy of public-private collaborations in Section 5. Section 6 
considers government regulation and its dual responsibilities of ensuring public safety and promoting 
technological advances. We then describe the factors influencing technological adoption in agriculture, 
followed by a brief conclusion. 
2. Agricultural research investments 
  According to the latest available figures, public and nonprofit funding accounts for about two-
thirds of global agricultural research expenditures, while private investments account for the other third 
(Wright et al, 2007). These aggregate figures mask the fact that the types and scope of research performed 
by the two sectors are neither perfectly substitutable nor independent. In general, private investments are 
far more concentrated by crop and technology than public investments, and tend to rely on the latter for 
the basic science inputs in order to produce applied technology (Alston et al, 1998).  
2.1 Research investment trends  
  Public spending on agricultural research experienced overall growth in the past few decades, from 
about $US 15.2 billion (at year 2000 prices) in 1981 to $23 billion in 2000 (Table 1). During the 1990s, 
public agricultural research expenditures by developing countries as a group exceeded those by developed 
countries for the first time. In no other sector does research expenditure by developing countries have 
comparable prominence. 
 China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand now undertake over half the investment in less 
developed countries. However research per capita or relative to agricultural output is far less 





countries: the U.S., Japan, France, and Germany. Developed countries spent about as much on public 
agricultural research ($US 12, 577M) in 2000 as developing countries spent on public research ($US 
12,819M). Private spending in developing countries was only $US 819 million., as shown in Table 1. 
(Wright et al, 2007; Wright and Pardey, 2006) 
As in energy, public and private research spending tends to increase in response to periods of 
high prices and go slack when low prices have restored a false sense of security. Public research 
spending, strong after the food price crises of the 1970s and early 1980s, declined during the 1990s in 
most areas. In developed countries, annual growth rates of 2.2% during the 1980s fell to 0.2% per year 
from 1991 to 1996. In Africa, growth in agricultural research spending ground to a halt in the 1990s, with 
some revival more recently. Spending in China and Latin America, on the other hand, grew in the early 
1990s after stagnating in the 1980s. China has been particularly focused on the agricultural biotechnology 
field, increasing spending from $17 million in 1986 to nearly $200 million by 2003 (Huang et al, 2002; 
Huang et al, 2005).  
  Other  measures of research investments reveal sharp contrasts between wealthy and poor nations. 
Both developed and less developed countries increased spending on public agricultural R&D per dollar 
agricultural output in the past few decades. In developed countries, spending on public agricultural R&D 
per dollar agricultural output increased to $2.64 per $100 agricultural output in 1995 from $1.53 per $100 
of output in 1975. In the developing world over this interval, growth in research intensities also increased 
on average, but the level was much lower and varied between countries. Growth was constant in China, 
increasing in other parts of Asia and in Latin America, but decreasing significantly in Africa.  
  While the rates of research expenditures are informative about recent policies, researchers have 
found the accumulated stock of research capital to be a more relevant determinant of research capabilities. 





value of agricultural output, is at least 12 times larger in the United States than in Africa, given reasonable 
rates of interest and depreciation.
2
2.2 International funding organizations 
 
  International funding agencies have been established to direct more research resources toward more 
efficiently serving the needs of poorer nations. Most notably, 1971 saw the establishment of the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR or CG), an international partnership 
between governments, private foundations, and civil society organizations that fund and influence the 
research of 15 international agricultural research centers (IARCs). CGIAR’s roots are in the 1943 
International Agriculture Program, a cooperative effort initiated by the U.S. and Mexican governments 
with significant support from the Rockefeller Foundation. The Mexican Program became the 
“International Center for the Improvement of Maize and Wheat.” The relatively simple funding and 
managerial structure proved superior to the less focused agenda of the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) in producing major agricultural innovations. It developed high-yielding semi-dwarf 
wheat varieties that were more responsive to nitrogen fertilizer. Contemporaneous innovation in the 
fertilizer sector enabled production of cheaper nitrogen fertilizer from natural gas. The technology 
package offering cheaper nitrogen fertilizer and the wheat varieties that could exploit it laid the basis for 
the Green Revolution in wheat in Mexico and Asia. Desire to broaden the scope of yield increases to 
other crops prompted the establishment of similarly-structures research centers in Colombia, Nigeria, and 
the Phillippines by 1971.  
  The need for a broader funding base to support the new centers led the International Agriculture 
Program to enlist the participation of a large range of other donors, including several national aid 
organizations, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development, the United Nations Development Program, and the World Bank, in the 
                                                 
2 For further details, see Wright et al (2007) and Wright and Pardey (2006) from which this section is 
largely drawn. See also Pardey et al (2006) for a discussion of agricultural research investments in less 





establishment of the CGIAR (CGIAR, 2008). After establishment, the annual spending of the members of 
the CGIAR grew rapidly, from $1.3 million supporting four centers in 1965, to $141 million supporting 
eleven centers by 1980, and $305 million supporting thirteen centers by 1990. Growth slowed in the 
1990s, so that spending per center during this decade declined. Between 1994-2002, and in response to 
critiques of the Green Revolution, complacency regarding food supplies, and the conflicting agendas and 
diverse interests of funding entities, total CGIAR funding dropped in real terms. Investments in 
germplasm enhancement research declined at 6.5% per year during this time, reflecting a shifted focus to 
policy and environmental objectives. This pattern was mirrored by similar declines in agricultural aid and 
research funding from the European Community, the World Bank, and USAID from the mid-1980s 
through the 1990s. More recently, in response to high agricultural prices and a renewed recognition of the 
importance of an adequate food supply, funding has begun to trend upward again. CGIAR funding was 
over $495 million in 2007, and World Bank agricultural lending increased from an annual average of $1.5 
billion in 2002 to $4.6 billion between 2006-2008. (Wright et al, 2007; Lele 2003; Lele et al, 2003; 
CGIAR Independent Review Panel, 2008; World Bank Group, 2009)  
3. A history of US public agricultural support  
  The U.S. made an early commitment to agricultural research in the form of agricultural institutional 
innovations adopted from Europe. Economists have emphasized the success of the land grant college 
system (National Research Council, 1995; Huffman and Evenson, 2006; Ruttan 1980; Ruttan 1982), 
noting its contribution to lowered food costs, rural development, and the prominence of U.S. agriculture 
globally (Adelaja, 2003). A lesson embedded in the long history of U.S. public support for agriculture is 
the importance of a large buildup of research capital stock through sustained investment. In addition, the 
nationwide adoption of agricultural innovations was encouraged by a decentralized institutional system 
capable of adapting technology to local environmental conditions, as was incorporated in the land-grant 
colleges and state agricultural experiment stations. 





  Spatial environmental variation forms the context in which technology and resources determine 
agricultural productivity. The expansion of arable land followed by mechanical innovations produced by 
farmers and blacksmiths drove early increases in U.S. agricultural output (Huffman and Evenson, 2006; 
Sunding and Zilberman, 2001). Major increases in yields per acre were not achieved until the advances in 
hybrid seed and agrichemical technology in the 1930s. Until that time, biological innovation focused on 
disseminating and adapting crops to unfamiliar frontier environments (Olmstead and Rhode, 1993).  
  Human efforts to locate and distribute plant genetic material appropriate for given production 
environments or meeting particular consumer needs, originated long before the groundbreaking 
discoveries of Mendel and Darwin, not to mention recent work in genetically engineered crops.
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  In the U.S., prominent figures such as George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas 
Jefferson all recognized the benefits of acquiring diverse plant resources and endeavored to introduce 
improved plant varieties into the country. Jefferson himself once wrote, “The greatest service which can 
be rendered any country is to add a useful plant to its culture,”
 
Heightened recognition of the economic value of plants in the context of the Industrial Revolution and 
their scientific documentation and classification encouraged the spread of botanic gardens across Europe 
in the 18th and 19th centuries. In particular, Britain’s Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew excelled in the 
acquisition, development, and dissemination of economically important plants (Juma, 1989). A 
physician’s experimentation with urban plant cultivation in the polluted atmosphere of London during the 
Industrial Revolution led to the invention of the Wardian case or terrarium, an enclosed container that 
vastly increased the reliability of international transportation of live plants between the new and old 
worlds (Schoenermarck, 1974). 
4
                                                 
3 Juma (1989) gives several examples of early plant-collecting expeditions and gardens spanning Ancient 
Egypt to Japan to colonial explorations of the Americas.  
 and went so far as to smuggle rice from 
the Piedmont region of Italy into the U.S., sewn into the lining of his coat pockets, when such a crime was 
punishable by death (Fowler, 1994). His enthusiasm for the importance of plant resources was shared by 
4 Thomas Jefferson, The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Federal Edition. New York and London: G.P. 





Henry Ellsworth, the first commissioner of the Patent Office and founder of what ultimately became the 
United States Department of Agriculture. Without Congressional approval, Ellsworth distributed seeds 
and plant material from other lands in order to test and promote their benefits. The U.S. Patent Office thus 
became the main repository for plant genetic material in the country, relying on the U.S. Navy to import 
foreign seed and the U.S. Post office to distribute seeds to farmers through the mail. Producing a number 
of documents on proven and potential economic benefits of plant resources, Ellsworth championed 
federal support for agriculture and the creation of an independent national agricultural research bureau. 
As a result, in 1839 Congress began to formally support seed collection, distribution, and research efforts 
by establishing the Agricultural Division of the Patent Office, which became the Department of 
Agriculture in 1862. (Harding, 1940; Huffman and Evenson, 2006).  
  This widespread recognition of plant resource benefits plus the dominance of the U.S. farmer 
population created a favorable political climate in support of the passage of the foundational 1862 Morrill 
(Land Grant Colleges) Act (7 U.S.C. § 301 et seq) and the 1887 Hatch Act (7 U.S.C. § 361a et seq). The 
Morrill Act allotted federal land to each state to support the development of a college focused on 
instruction in “agriculture and the mechanic arts.” (7 U.S.C. § 304). Originally blocked by southern states 
where education was viewed as a threat to the cheap labor supply, the Morrill Act was passed after the 
South seceded. The Hatch Act provided additional federal lands to conduct and disseminate research in 
SAESs associated with land grant colleges. In recognition of the importance of technology transfer 
mechanisms for realizing the benefits of research, the 1914 Smith-Lever Act established the Cooperative 
Extension Service to distribute knowledge relevant for the local adoption and application of innovations. 
These key acts balanced federal and state roles by combining federal financial support with state 
management for the administration and direction of research. The resulting structure provided an avenue 
to address local research needs while also exploiting interstate competition to motivate fruitful research. 
As early as 1888, states began to establish substations that addressed needs distributed at even finer 





  The case of hybrid corn exemplifies the advantage of regionally-focused agricultural research that 
benefited both local farmers and consumers generally. This innovation, which originated as a by-product 
of basic research in genetics conducted at Harvard decades earlier (Troyer, 2009), required additional 
decades of adaptive research after its initial adoption in the heart of the mid-west corn belt, to spread 
across the states in which it was ultimately established (Griliches, 1957).  
  The establishment of the SAES system in the U.S. borrowed heavily from European developments 
that firmly established the central role of universities and scientists in agricultural development. Justus 
von Leibig, a German chemist who founded the first modern chemistry laboratory, became one of the 
forefathers of agricultural science with his 1840 publication, Organic Chemistry in Its Relation to 
Agriculture and Physiology (Brock, 1997). During this time, agricultural research institutions in the states 
that eventually formed Germany demonstrated the potential power of a group of experts working on a 
focused field, highlighted the importance of consistent funding, provided valuable experience navigating 
the link between science and practice, and demonstrated the merits of inter-institutional competition. By 
the time of Liebig’s death in 1873, the newly united Germany had 25 agricultural research stations. The 
German development of successful university-based agricultural chemistry research laboratories and 
experiment stations became the model followed throughout the U.S. and Europe, where numerous 
agricultural experiment stations were also established during the second half of the nineteenth century. In 
particular, Rothamsted Agricultural Experiment Station in England, currently the oldest continuously 
operating agricultural experiment station, was founded by a fertilizer manufacturer in 1843. (Huffman and 
Evenson, 2006; Finlay, 1988).  
  The first U.S. stations continued the heavy emphasis on agricultural chemistry established in 
Germany, and Samuel W. Johnson, the first director of a U.S. agricultural experiment station, was trained 
by a founder of the German system. By the time the Hatch Act was passed, 15 primarily state-funded 
experiment stations were already in operation. 
  Major benefits of public research for agricultural productivity in the U.S. began to accrue only after 





during 1870-1925, agricultural productivity was strongly correlated with the total real public-agricultural 
research spending over the preceding 18 years. Early advances in U.S. agriculture were largely borrowed 
from progress made in Europe. It took several decades of development and learning before the U.S. land 
grant/SAES system had acquired the scientific capacity and research base necessary to become an 
efficient system of innovation  (Huffman and Evenson, 2006). Subsequent research has confirmed that 
stable agricultural funding promotes persistent gains in agricultural productivity (White and Havlicek 
(1982). 
 3.2 Private interests and the allocation of public funding 
  Since private research focuses mainly on commercializable technologies with appropriable benefits, 
the onus is on the public sector to produce basic science and undertake research that may be high in risk, 
have long lag times, or create unpredictable and non-excludable benefits (Alston et al, 1998; Stokes, 
1997; Huffman and Evenson, 2006; Just and Huffman, 1992). High rates of return to investments in 
different types of agricultural technologies persist, implying  that those investments have overall made 
excellent use of public funds, but also that the level of funding has been inadequate (Judd et al, 1986; 
Huffman and Evenson, 2006). In addition, in cases where public support for research has declined and 
there are private incentives or IPRs for innovation, some observers have concluded that public research 
funds have been increasingly directed toward the development of private goods (for example, Knudson 
and Pray, 1991). Economists have warned that heightened private influence over public research agendas 
may further erode public support for research, thus damaging the system by which basic science and 
public goods research is produced (Just and Huffman, 1992). However, Foltz et al (2007) found evidence 
of economies of scale and scope in life science research production of patents and journal articles, 
particularly in land grant universities, implying synergies may exist in university production of private 
and public goods. 
  A second concern related to public funding has been discussed in a number of empirical studies that 
suggest interregional externalities in the U.S. significantly affect state research investment levels 





citing unpublished work, Alston (2002) purports that averaging across U.S. states, over half the measured 
within-state productivity gains may be derived from the benefits of research investments made elsewhere. 
Such spillovers, both within and among nations, may contribute to underinvestments in research. In 
addition, studies by Hayami and Ruttan (1971) and Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) suggest that nationally 
or globally, consumers are the main beneficiaries of agricultural research since low price elasticity of 
demand for agricultural products means that higher productivity achieved by innovation will translate into 
lower prices (Guttman, 1978). However, in a world of highly efficient global transportation, the relatively 
small share of benefits from lower prices that accrues to consumers in a single state tends to limit within-
state consumer support for agricultural research that increases national or global productivity (Rose-
Ackerman and Evenson, 1985).  
  For region-specific production-oriented research (especially on crops as opposed to animals), the 
negative price response on international markets may be negligible. Local farmers tend to get a substantial 
share of the benefits of this type of research, given the level of other research activity. Political  support 
tends to be high for region-specific innovation, suggesting that farmers have substantial influence on 
relevant research spending. Empirical studies have found that  U.S. state spending on agricultural research 
significantly and positively correlates with state characteristics such as per capita income, the share of 
rural population, the number of large farms, the political influence of farmers, and the number of firms 
producing agricultural inputs, while spending is negatively influenced by the ability to adopt technology 
produced in other states (Rose-Ackerman and Evenson, 1985; Guttman, 1971; Huffman and 
Mirankowski, 1981). In developing countries, on the other hand, underinvestment in regionally specific 
crops such as cassava and sweet potatoes in the 1970s relates to the relatively low influence of staple food 
producers and small farmers on research agendas (Judd et al, 1987).  
4. Intellectual property for agricultural innovations 
4.1 Methods for protecting intellectual property rights in agriculture 
Beginning with the 1930 Plant Patent Act, the United States has created a number of institutional 





technologies. The eligibility criteria, duration, and nature of rights conferred vary across these IPRs, and a 
single innovation may be protected under multiple mechanisms under the same or different legal 
jurisdictions. The first IPR specifically for plants was introduced by the 1930 Plant Patent Act, allowing 
plant patents for new and distinct varieties of most asexually propagated plants, while the USDA 
administers the separate Plant Variety Protection Certificates (PVPCs) for sexually reproduced plant 
varieties, in accordance with the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA).  U.S. legislators based the 
PVPA on the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) – an 
agreement established in 1961 by a group of Western European countries that lays out a model system for 
plant breeders’ rights, which was itself influenced by the United States Plant Patent Act of 1930.  
Subsequently, the controversial ruling of the 1980 Diamond v. Chakrabarty case (Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty 447 US 303, 1980) confirmed the applicability of utility patents for living organisms in the 
U.S. (Ex parte Hibberd 227 USPQ 433 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985)). Since the decision, utility patents 
have been applied to plant varieties, genetically engineered organisms, processes for expressing 
transformations, genes, traits, and materials. The 2001 J.E.M. v. Pioneer Supreme Court case confirmed 
the legality of joint protection under utility patents and a PVPC or a plant patent (J.E.M. AG Supply v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International 122 S. Ct. 593, 2001).  
Trade secrets, trademarks and geographical indications (GIs) may also apply to agricultural 
innovations. Legally a right based on state common law, trade secrecy can be invoked by firms that can 
demonstrate sufficient efforts to protect proprietary information of commercial value. It is frequently 
relied upon by innovators prior to obtaining a patent or other IP protection (Friedman et al, 1991), but has 
high value independent of patenting; important surveys have shown that innovators in most industries 
rank secrecy higher than patenting for effectively appropriating commercial value (Levin et al, 1987; 
Cohen et al, 2000). The model trade secret law, known as the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, has been 
adopted by 46 states. Trade secrecy has been more important recently in agricultural biotechnology 
research, since advances in biotechnology have improved detection of infringement (Boettiger et al, 





  To the extent that bioenergy development relies upon plant innovation, we can expect most of the 
above mechanisms (and their drawbacks, discussed below) to be relevant for energy technology. A 
common area of confusion concerns the jurisdiction of IPRs. It is important to note that a patent or PVPC 
can be enforced only in the jurisdiction in which it is granted.
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4.2 The private sector response 
 While the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPs) among the World Trade Organization (WTO) members 
mandates minimal standards for all types of IPRs, only copyright has virtually global reach, under the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which is largely incorporated in the 
WTO TRIPs agreement. 
The private sector response to the new opportunities and incentives in agricultural biotechnology has been 
focused and forceful. Since 1987, over 55% of all field trials for genetically modified (“GM”)  crops have 
been on corn and soybean varieties. Global GM crop value and planted area is almost entirely in 
soybeans, corn, cotton, and canola (James, 2008). Monsanto has become the dominant firm in generation 
and diffusion of agricultural biotechnology, concentrating its activities on corn, soybeans, and cotton 
incorporating herbicide resistant “Roundup Ready” technology and pest-resistant traits based on crystal 
proteins derived from samples of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt). It is unlikely that public research institutions 
could have matched the efficiency and scale of Monsanto and other leading firms in these activities. For 
example, in 1998, Monsanto spent $1.26 billion in agricultural biotechnology research and development, 
eclipsing the total CGIAR investment of $25 million in agricultural biotechnology that same year (Pardey 
and Beintema, 2005).  
4.3 IPR limitations and drawbacks 
                                                 
5 The well-publicized case of “Golden Rice,” transformed to include pro-vitamin A, has been 
characterized as subject to scores of widely-held patents and as an excellent example of private-sector 
collaboration in licensing these patents for use in poor rice-consuming countries. In fact, few if any of the 
patents were relevant to production or use of the technology in major poor rice-consuming countries; 





   While the most popular modern rationale for granting IPRs is that they motivate technological 
innovation and dissemination by at least partially privatizing associated social benefits, the experience in 
agriculture shows both the strengths and the limitations of IPRs in a well-balanced system of dynamic, 
creative research. First, private research has not been (and likely never will be) a complete substitute for 
public agricultural research (Alston et al, 1995). While the recent strengthening of intellectual property 
rights in the U.S. opened the way for increased private participation in basic plant breeding research by 
major firms such as Monsanto and Pioneer (Falck-Zepeda and Traxler, 2000), the private sector primarily 
performs applied research with the goal of producing a profitable technology or product. Private sector 
research critically depends on the public sector to produce the “building blocks” for technology. (Alston 
et al, 1998; Stokes, 1997; Huffman and Evenson, 2006; Just and Huffman, 1992)  
Economists have recognized that the intellectual property protection of research at public 
institutions might erode the provision of such public goods. For example, Just and Huffman (2009) note 
that while the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act led to a jump in university patenting (from less than 400 patents per 
year before Bayh-Dole to 1100 per year by 1989 and over 3000 per year in the 1990s), the act may have 
reduced the pool of basic research supporting private research, shifting the focus of public research 
towards shorter-term incentives such as patents, at the expense of  future public goods research. 
Furthermore, there appears to be great variation in private responses to different forms of 
intellectual property. While Fuglie et al (1996) found that in the U.S., private investments in agricultural 
biotechnology increased fourfold (nominal) in the first twelve years after the Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
ruling, Alston and Venner (2002) were unable to find evidence of increased private-sector investments in 
wheat breeding as a response to the PVPA, which they conclude is more relevant to marketing than 
research. 
4.3 Anticommons in agricultural research and market concentration 
There is mounting evidence that multiple, mutually blocking intellectual property claims on 





agricultural research (Wright and Pardey, 2006; Pardey et al, 2007). The rising application of IPRs to 
plant components and processes imposes high transaction costs for researchers who must acquire or 
license fragmented proprietary inputs to develop and commercialize a single downstream innovation.  
Agricultural economists have long been concerned that patents on locked-in but otherwise non-
crucial genetic technologies have been retarding innovation and affecting the market structure of private 
research. In the field of plant biotechnology in particular, where ownership of the genes, markers, or 
promoters incorporated in a single innovation is fragmented, upstream IPR-holders, unwilling to allow 
commercialization of varieties using their property, have in some instances foreclosed university 
development of new crops or technologies.
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In a 2003 Science article signed by fourteen university presidents, chancellors, and foundation 
presidents, the authors highlight the negative effect of intellectual property rights on “freedom to operate” 
in agricultural research (Atkinson et al, 2003). In fact, universities themselves appear to have contributed 
to the problem by insisting on the use of material transfer agreements (MTAs) governing exchanges of 
research materials between researchers, to protect university intellectual property rights and limit 
university liability.  
 The broader economics profession has become focused on 
these issues more recently, due to growing problems with blocking patents on embedded software (Besen 
and Hunt, 2004; Lemley and Shapiro, 2005; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; Cohen et al, 2000). The Supreme 
Court appears to have acknowledged this problem in its eBay decision (eBay Inc v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)), which reduced the ability of holders of blocking patents to use the threat of 
injunction to extract high royalties from infringers.  
                                                 
6 For example, the cases of the GE tomato and herbicide-resistant strawberry at the University of 
California at Berkeley, an herbicide tolerant barley, and an herbicide tolerant turf grass at the University 
of Michigan (Wright, 1998; Wright et al, 2007; Erbisch, 2000). More recently, commercialization of 
transgenic hypoallergenic wheat technology has been blocked by a combination of patent protection and 
regulatory costs. (P. Lemaux, personal communication) Generation of further examples is unlikely, given 
that independent university implementation of new transgenic technologies is widely regarded as 





A recent survey indicates that, for scientists focused on their own research goals rather than 
commercialization of innovations, the problems associated with MTAs are more salient than concerns 
about patent infringement. Over a third of agricultural biologists at Land Grant Universities reported 
delays in obtaining access to research tools in the five years preceding the survey, with a mean of two 
delays and a mean duration of over eight months (Lei et al, 2009). They attributed the vast majority of 
these delays to problems experienced by university administrators in negotiating  MTAs. Researchers 
reported responding to hold-ups by substituting tools, sometimes of lower efficacy, and in some cases by 
abandoning the project altogether. Although a substantial portion of the sample were patentees, most 
respondents view intellectual property protection as a net negative for progress of research in their fields. 
Follow-up interviews revealed that scientists view university administrators as principally 
concerned with protecting their institutions’ financial interestsm including protecting claims to potential 
intellectual property value and reducing exposure to potential liability. Indeed, Glenna et al’s 2007 survey 
reveals that land-grant university administrators, on average, rate the provision of new funds and research 
support as the greatest advantage of university-industry research collaborations, but believe that scientists 
choose projects based on research enjoyment and scientific curiosity. 
Private firms in agricultural biotechnology, unlike bench scientists, cannot ignore infringement 
issues. Often, firms have to commit to commercializing a product involving many patents, subject to 
time-consuming development and regulatory approval processes, and thus exposed to holdup even by 
owners of non-essential technologies that become “locked in” as innovation progresses. Firms have 
established  freedom to operate largely by merger and acquisition of patentees, rather than by in-licensing.  
Since the mid-1990s, a relatively dramatic series of industry purchases led to concentration of the 
agricultural biotechnology sector. As a result, a relatively modest number of private hands controls a 
major portion of patents in the field (Murray and Stern, 2007; Marco and Rausser, 2008). In effect, the 
threat of an anticommons with many parties capable of stopping a line of business in progress via an 





potential hold-ups by acquisition or merger. The European conglomerate AgrEvo acquired Plant Genetic 
Systems (PGS) for $730 million, $700 million of which accounted for the estimated value of PGS-owned 
patents on plant traits. Perhaps more extreme was Monsanto’s 1997 purchase of Holden’s Foundation 
Seeds for $1.1 billion, when Holden’s gross revenues were just $40 million. In 1998, Monsanto paid $2.3 
billion to acquire the 60% of DeKalb Genetics Corporation which it did not already own. DeKalb, the 
owner of a major corn transformation technology, had a 1997 total revenue of $450 million (United States 
Department of Justice, 1998; Marco and Rausser, 2008). The following year, DuPont Co. purchased the 
remaining 80% of Pioneer Hi-Bred International that it did not already own for $7.7 billion (Marco and 
Rausser, 2008). 
Based on USDA data between 1988-2000, Brennan et al (2005) found that when including 
mergers and acquisitions, the top ten firms (rated by number of patents held) owned more than half of the 
agricultural biotech patents granted through 2000, whereas if patents acquired via purchases and mergers  
are excluded, the share owned by the top ten firms would be only one third. One firm (Monsanto) 
currently accounts for almost two-thirds of all public and private plant biotech field trials in the United 
States. King and Schimmelpfennig (2005) show that by 2002, six firms (Monsanto, Dow, Dupont, BASF, 
Bayer, and Syngenta) controlled over 40% of the agricultural biotech patents owned by the private sector, 
with the subsidiaries acquired by these firms through mergers and acquisitions responsible for 70% of 
their total patent stocks. Concentration in the innovation market has continued to increase; USDA data on 
field releases of new genetically modified organisms show Monsanto’s dominance in the testing of new 
GM products (Figure 1).  
Thus the need to ensure freedom to operate in an environment of initially fragmented and 
decentralized proprietary claims enhanced the normal tendency of firms in a new industry to consolidate 
in order to avoid transaction costs, exploit increasing returns to scale, and establish market power 
(Rausser, 1999). Notably, Marco and Rausser (2008) empirically show that in the plant biotechnology 





consolidation. Additionally, the authors note that a number of mergers, including Monsanto-Calgene and 
Monsanto-DeKalb, occurred in the context of patent infringement litigation.  
It appears to be true that IP-induced consolidation in agricultural biotechnology is negatively 
affecting the very same innovation and dissemination incentives that justified IPRs in the first place. By 
blocking new firms from entering, market consolidation may suppress future innovation (Barton, 1998; 
Graff et al, 2004). Lack o f freedom to operate particularly affects nonprofit research institutions, which 
cannot solve the problem by merger or acquisition of blocking firms.  
4.4 Attempts to alleviate the anticommons: BiOS and PIPRA 
Early recognizing the threat from lack of freedom to operate, public and nonprofit parties have 
formed institutions which endeavored to construct alternative technologies that could circumvent patents 
blocking key transformation technologies. These include the Biological Innovation for Open Society 
(BiOS) and Public-Sector Intellectual Property for Agriculture (PIPRA) initiatives, which have both 
attracted widespread attention from biologists in the biomedical sector.  
Inspired by the successful open source models in software, BiOS, an open source initiative arising 
out of  the nonprofit biotechnology firm CAMBIA, was formed to license rights to use protected 
innovations, including those that could substitute for technologies protected by blocking patents, in 
exchange for a commitment to share any downstream technologies with all BiOS members (Jefferson, 
2006). It appears that this bold initiative has not functioned as anticipated. Participants willing to  access 
CAMBIA technologies offered by BiOS are apparently reluctant to follow the lead of CAMBIA and offer 
their own technologies under an “open source” license.
7
                                                 
7 Stricly speaking the license was not open source as participants are charged on a sliding scale based on 
size.  
 A more fundamental problem might be that any 
success achieved in open source software using copyright licenses to prevent appropriation of the core 
technology might be difficult to replicate in a system that relies on patent protection (Boettiger and 





PIPRA, founded with support from the University of California and the Rockefeller and 
McKnight Foundations, was intended to act as a clearinghouse for information about patenting and 
licensing of technologies originating in the public and nonprofit sector. The goal was to facilitate 
commercialization and adoption of new technologies in less developed countries and of “minor” crops 
such as the fruits and vegetables produced in California. The common problem of both target groups was 
that their markets were too small to attract much interest from the major agricultural biotechnology 
corporations. PIPRA’s intellectual property strategy, similar to that of CAMBIA, was to protect 
proprietary claims for commercial use in developed countries (consistent with federal policy expressed in 
the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and with the aims of university licensing objectives), while simultaneously 
providing access to users in less developed countries and producers of minor crops, and reserving public 
and nonprofit institutions’ rights to use the inventions in developing country applications.  
While these initiatives yielded notable scientific advances (see for example Broothaerts et al 
2005), neither has yet furnished an efficient and completely unencumbered biotechnology package that is 
a good substitute for proprietary blocking technologies that received wide market acceptance. Indeed, the 
experience of these initiatives constitutes strong evidence of the blocking capacity of proprietary claims 
over key elements of plant transformation. The lack of attractive unencumbered alternative technology 
sets may be the main reason why efforts to encourage collaboration in open-source type ventures have not 
made more headway. However, had they already succeeded at this level, the regulatory hurdles would 
still have loomed large.  
Although attempts to offer unencumbered alternatives to key technologies are continuing, both 
CAMBIA and PIPRA are currently emphasizing provision of easily accessible information to researchers 
in developing countries and non-profit institutions regarding freedom to operate within the context of 
patenting as the dominant paradigm. They offer other services that can assist public and nonprofit 
research institutions in navigating patent thickets and identifying intellectual property issues before they 





of the IP landscape and promote innovation-enabling collaboration, as well as a valuable IP handbook. 
CAMBIA offers, among other services, its “Patent Lens” to provide accessible guidance as to the patent 
landscape relevant to the plans of researchers in biotechnology (Graff et al, 2001; Atkinson et al, 2003; 
Delmer et al, 2003). 
5. Public-private collaborations 
  Channeling fruitful basic research from the public sector into applied research efforts by the 
private sector is a key, though problematic, step in the innovation “pipeline.” Economists have often 
highlighted the potential for public-private collaborations to bridge this gap and have argued for their 
critical role in spreading agricultural biotech innovations for consumers in developing countries (Rausser 
et al, 2000; Byerlee and Fischer, 2002; Tollens et al 2004; Parker and Zilberman, 1993).  In light of 
slowed federal research support between 1980 and 2000, collaborations with the private sector have 
become increasingly attractive for public sector researchers. However, public-private collaborations do 
not currently account for a large portion of agricultural research in practice. A few examples illustrate of 
the potential benefits and drawbacks of these agreements.  
Overcoming conflicts between private sector interests and public responsibilities is a key 
challenge to fruitful public/private collaboration. In their 1986 analysis of the Canadian malting barley 
industry, Ulrich et al (1986) find that the availability of grants from and collaborative work with the 
brewing industry led the public sector to pursue traits to improve malting quality. Although the research 
yielded both public and private benefits, the collaboration siphoned public resources away from yield-
related traits. Ulrich et al calculate social gains would have been 40% higher or more had public 
researchers focused only on yield-related traits. Note that this example is drawn from an era when 
intellectual property protection had yet to strongly influence the direction of research activity in 
agriculture. 
The subsequent proliferation of patenting in universities has increased the potential for diversion 
of the university agenda toward private monetary returns and away from the direct public interest. Such a 





public support for universities (Just and Huffman, 2009), even if the ultimate motive is to ensure survival 
of the institution in an era of public cutbacks. Supporting this argument are Glenna et al’s (2007) findings 
that land grant university administrators rate further support for research and increased funding as the 
main benefits from university-industry collaborations, and potential for conflicts of interest as their main 
drawback.  
An innovation in private support for public agricultural research was established by the 1998 
agreement between the University of California at Berkeley and the Novartis Foundation. The latter was 
selected by Berkeley as partner after competitive bids from several firms. The agreement generated much 
opposition,  motivated by opposition to the genetic transformation technologies involved in the research 
to be funded, by objections to the decision-making procedures that led to the partnership, and by concern 
that the university was selling its plant biology agenda to the highest bidder and that new private-sector 
influence might distort the direction of university research. The Novartis Foundation had the right to a 
vaguely-specified subset of the research results in plant and molecular biology and had a minority of seats 
on the committee allocating project resources. (Busch et al, 2004; Rausser, 1999)  
In hindsight, the $25 million received from the Novartis (later Syngenta) Foundation appears to 
have been associated with an increase in the level and the diversity of funding of  Plant and Molecular 
Biology at Berekeley, with little if any affect on research direction. It appears that no valuable patents 
were obtained by the funder. Indeed a similarly generous arrangement is unlikely to be achieved in future 
public-private partnerships in biotechnology. Nevertheless an ex post review (Busch et al, 2004) 
concluded, among other things, that the agreement did affect the processes leading to the initial denial of 
tenure (later reversed) to a prominent critic of the agreement. Even relatively hands-off funders, it seems, 
create the hazard of a threat to academic freedom in the university. 
Subsequently, Berkeley has become the lead partner (with Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) in the $500 million Environmental 
Biosciences Initiative (EBI), funded by British Petroleum and aimed at developing means of converting 





agreement are more favorable to the funder than in the Berkeley-Novartis agreement, but the EBI has not 
generated the same degree of opposition on campus. 
In another model of public-private collaboration known as Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreements (CRADAs), the U.S. provides research funds to national laboratories 
contributing non-financial resources in order to produce a commercial technology in collaboration with a 
private firm. Any proprietary material may be owned by both parties, but the private collaborator gets 
priority in licensing (Day-Rubenstein and Fuglie, 2000). Since 1987, the USDA has formed at least 700 
CRADAs with private firms. CRADAs have produced and commercialized at least a handful of important 
innovations (Day-Rubenstein and Fuglie, 2000).
8 In accordance with the goal of connecting the basic and 
applied ends, CRADA research focuses on a “middle ground” between public and private goods (Day-
Rubenstein and Fuglie, 2000). However, concerns that CRADAs and other public-private collaborations 
divert funds from public goods or basic research to more applied research highlight the need to carefully 
design collaboration agreements and to consider the unintended effects of undertaking collaborations 
(Just and Rausser, 1993). In addition, claims that CRADAs provide unfair advantages for the private 
partner (even if, as in the case of Taxol, the contract was awarded by auction), illustrate that any 
agreement mechanism providing profits high enough to incentivize private investment in a risky 
enterprise will be met with critical political comment if the CRADA succeeds.
9
Public-private collaborations also tend to be a target of public scrutiny that can negatively 
influence the credibility of government or other public entities to uphold their public responsibilities. In 
particular, public-private collaborations that do not convincingly protect public decision-making from 
  
                                                 
8 Most notably, a CRADA is responsible for production of the anti-cancer drug Taxol, based on the bark 
of the Pacific yew tree, and involving the USDA and its Forest Service (Koo and Wright, 1999). This 
highly successful drug is used in treatment of ovarian and breast cancers. In the agricultural field, 
CRADAs have been associated with the development of  a number of pest and disease controls, a chicken 
vaccine for Marek’s disease, and a chemical compound to reduce soil erosion (Day-Rubenstein and 
Fuglie, 2000). 
9 Even prominent economists will make such comments. See for example the claim by Boldrin and 
Levine (2008, Chapter 1) that any returns above “break-even” were superfluous to the incentive needed 





improper influence weaken the regulatory role of government. For example, widespread public distrust of 
government’s ability to regulate genetically modified organisms in Europe must be considered in the 
context of several major government failures to protect consumer safety. In particular, concerns that 
governments might prioritize industry welfare over public safety were fueled by poor regulation both 
paving the way for and in response to incidents such as the Chernobyl disaster and the spread of BSE 
(bovine spongiform encephalopathy, commonly known as “mad cow disease”) (Park, 1989; BBC News, 
2000; CNN, 2001).  
On the other hand, research consortium models such as those adopted by the Latin American 
Maize Project (LAMP) and the Germplasm Enhancement of Maize Project (GEM) have been lauded for 
productively balancing public goods research with commercial viability (Knudson, 2000). Initiated by 
then Pioneer CEO William Brown, LAMP was established in 1987 as a cooperative effort to regenerate 
and utilize maize landraces, supported by funding from Pioneer and resources from the U.S., 11 Latin 
American countries, and the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) (Knudson, 
2000; CIMMYT, 1997). Of the 12,000 accessions evaluated by LAMP, 51 accessions plus 7 donated 
from DeKalb formed the source material for the USDA-ARS GEM Project. Jointly funded by an array of 
private, public, and non-profit collaborators and utilizing research from federal programs, state programs, 
and private industry, GEM’s structure recognized needs from the local to national levels and maintained 
industry support through appropriate IPR provisions (Knudson, 2000).  
6. Government regulation 
  From an economic perspective, government regulation is necessary to correct for externalities such 
as those related to environmental quality, food safety, and public security. Aside from immediate social, 
environmental, and economic costs, past regulatory disasters and their aftermaths demonstrate that 
ineffective or disingenuous government practices create a secondary problem of reduced public 
confidence and support. On the other hand, the costs of regulatory compliance can discourage innovation 
and technology adoption. The challenge to government is to strike a balance between supporting 





6.1 Public trust 
  Experience in agriculture demonstrates that a poor track record or a handful of extreme cases may 
durably erode public confidence in the government’s ability to prudently select and monitor new 
technologies. The U.S. Three Mile Island incident and the Ukrainian Chernobyl disaster caused 
significant curtailment of nuclear power projects in Sweden and Italy, respectively, and weakened public 
trust in government officials and scientists alike (Weingart, 2002). Studies of government regulation and 
public perceptions drew parallels between the cases of nuclear power and agricultural biotechnology 
(Sjoberg, 2001; Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2005). Indeed, Chernpbyl’s contamination of European foods 
was initially denied by many governments, and Chernobyl’s effect on public perceptions of technological 
risks, government competence, and the reliability of public assurances has contributed to the prohibition 
of genetically modified foods in Europe (Vogel, 2001; Lusk et al, 2003).  
  Past crises in food safety have also demonstrated the consequences for public health, government 
reputation, and industry. After the BSE outbreak was recognized in Britain, European regulatory systems 
were further discredited by the British Ministry of Agriculture’s insistence that BSE posed no threat to 
human health and the French government’s slow response to BSE (Vogel, 2001; Daley, 2001). The direct 
effects of BSE on beef consumtion and the subsequent trade bans caused heavy losses to beef producers. 
The containment costs borne by the British government reached £700 million per year in 1996, or about 
0.1% of GDP (Gollier et al, 2001). Another example is the release by the European multinational firm 
Aventis of genetically engineered corn, StarLink, into the U.S. food supplies, when the corn was 
approved only for feed. Fortunately no  health damage to consumers was detected. Aventis agreed to pay 
$110 million plus interest to farmers whose crops were contaminated (O’Hanlon, 2004; Pollack, 2001; 
Shuren, 2008) to compensate for adverse effects on prices of exports due to fears of harmful 
contamination.  
  The StarLink case not withstanding, the lack of major food-related regulatory disasters in recent 
U.S. experience likely has contributed to greater public acceptance and employment of agricultural 





perception are not confined by national boundaries and can become confounded with strategic market 
maneuvers. For example, China changed its plans to approve GM foods when the StarLink incident 
cooled demand for GM corn by importers Japan and South Korea (Cohen and Paarlberg, 2004). In North 
America, the U.S. wheat industry compelled the agricultural biotech firm Monsanto to release the first 
genetically engineered spring wheat in the U.S. and Canada, or not at all. The technology was shelved in 
both countries when Canada rejected the product (Berwald et al, 2006).  
  Considering the commonalities of the above cases, we would expect public trust problems to be 
most influential for technologies related to foods, with uncertain but potentially widespread and 
irreversible risks, and in cases where the benefits are dubious from the consumer viewpoint (Arrow and 
Fischer, 1974; Brush et al, 1992). Bioenergy products, especially if they are not related to foods or feeds, 
might be better accepted due to the widespread recognition of the benefits of a cleaner and more secure 
energy supply. 
6.2 Non-adaptive regulatory systems and unintended consequences 
   While negligent regulatory systems can precipitate public safety disasters, the costs of extremely 
restrictive regulatory systems are less transparent but may also be severe. They can impede the 
application of technology, implying missed opportunities to realize the benefits of research and 
innovation. Cases in various countries show that both lack of regulatory capacity and public distrust may 
lead to regulatory procedures that  slow adoption of technology. In addition, relatively stringent 
regulatory standards for a particular set of technologies create an advantage for substitutes.
10
  The case of U.S. agricultural chemical regulation illustrates some of the tradeoffs related to 
standard setting. Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo (1995) found that between 1972 and 1989, in response 
to three amendments tightening regulatory requirements, industry-wide research spending increased, but 
the share of regulatory costs in total R&D increased from 18% to an astounding 60%. The authors also 
 Thus, 
government safety standards have indirect but important effects on market structure.   
                                                 
10 Graff and Zilberman (2007) argue that the interests of European pesticide and herbicide producers have 





found that each 10% increase in regulatory costs corresponded to a 2.7% reduction in the number of new 
pesticides products, but also decreased the negative environmental qualities of the pesticides produced. 
Regulatory costs affected the market by increasing foreign capture of market share, reducing the number 
of small firms and broadening opportunities for biological pesticides and GMOs.  As this example shows, 
the net effects of regulation are hard to pin down. 
  Many governments have  recently enacted regulatory standards for the release of agricultural 
biotechnology to address concerns about potential ecological and food safety risks. While some scientists 
fear the standards for transgenic crops do not adequately inform us about potential risks, economists have 
argued that these regulations hinder implementation of important technologies (Fuglie et al, 2006; 
Zilberman, 2006; Pardey et al, 2007; Cohen and Paarlberg, 2004). For example, lack of mutual 
recognition of regulatory standards and test results requires duplication of field trials for transgenic crops 
in some East and South African countries, without generation of new information between test trials, and 
has slowed commercialization (Pardey et al, 2007; Thomson, 2004).  
  In India, regulatory authorities approved the first field trials for Bt transgenic cotton in 1998. 
Although the crop had been grown as early as 1996 in countries such U.S., Australia, South Africa, 
Mexico, Argentina, and China, outcry by NGO groups claiming to represent farmers influenced 
regulatory officials to delay final approval for Bt cotton until 2002 – about six months after authorities 
discovered some 500 Gujarati farmers had already illegally planted Bt cotton seeds. Public plans to 
destroy the standing crop were abandoned after demonstrations by thousands of farmers. Even more 
extreme is the case of a transgenic mustard variety which underwent field trials in India for at least nine 
years (Cohen and Paarlberg, 2004), but is yet to be commercialized. If biofuel technology utilizes 
transgenic crop innovations, inflexible and inefficient regulatory systems could significantly defer this 
alternative fuel’s production and utilization.  
  For transgenic food crops in the U.S., the Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protection 
Agency, and USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service all have regulatory authority concerning 





(Vogt and Parish, 1999; Fuglie et al, 1996). While public opinion and government policy create a less 
hostile environment for GMOs relative to the regulatory environments in areas such as Europe and Africa, 
some economists maintain that U.S. regulation for transgenic crops is unduly restrictive, relative to 
regulations for competing technologies (Miller and Conko, 2005).  
  In industries subject to market concentration, such as the agricultural biotech industry, insights 
from capture theory suggest pushes for regulatory reform are likely not forthcoming. High compliance 
costs associated with stringent regulatory standards may even be preferred by firms with market power 
since such standards create barriers to entry and build consumer approval (Zilberman, 2006). For 
example, in 1925 California adopted the One-Variety Cotton Law, requiring nearly all California cotton 
growers to plant a single USDA-controlled cotton variety in the interests of quality control. In their 1994 
analysis of the regulation, Constantine et al (1994) argue that any initial benefits were lost over time due 
to unforeseen technological changes, institutional reforms, and regulatory cost increases. While the 
industry was partially deregulated in 1978, private beneficiaries of the regulation successfully resisted 
further reform for a number of years, despite the regulation’s large social costs. 
  Economists have critiqued the precautionary principle (cited by European GMO regulators) for 
failing to respond to new information (Gollier et al, 2001; Vogel, 2001). In agricultural biotechnology, 
the firm bears the costs of regulatory compliance. Although farming of biotech food crops has grown 
rapidly in recent years, the still narrow breadth of the market may be influenced by regulations slowing 
commercialization of new transgenic traits beyond herbicide tolerance and Bt-based insect resistance in 
corn, soybeans, canola and cotton (Pardey et al, 2007).  
7. Technology adoption 
  Timely adoption is necessary in order to realize the benefits of innovation. The most relevant aspect 
of adoption in the agricultural sector is the dispersed application and management of technologies adapted 
to local environments. The period between technology development and widespread adoption by farmers 





corn adoption and subsequent empirical studies
11
7.1 Profitability and heterogeneity 
 showed that the rate of technology diffusion increased 
with profitability from its adoption. A multitude of economic studies has taught us that factors such as 
risk and heterogeneity are crucial determinants of adoption. In addition, the canon of relevant political 
economic work highlights the dependence of adoption on consumer preferences, political interests, and 
the appropriateness of technology. With respect to energy innovations, we might expect analogous issues 
to arise for technologies with similarly dispersed applications. Again, production of biofuel crop 
technologies is a clear example, but prior adoption research might also be relevant for technologies like 
cookstoves for less developed countries, mini or micro hydroelectric systems, wind farms and building 
efficiency innovations, all of which could well have user-dependent outcomes affected by the 
heterogeneity of regulations and of the natural environment. 
  The recent increases in market concentration due to strengthened IPRs in agriculture (as discussed 
above) might well imply oligopoly pricing that reduces adoption of technologies integrating proprietary 
components. However, the dispersed use of agricultural technologies in heterogeneous environments 
constrains the extent of non-competitive pricing if spatial price discrimination is costly. Thus, even firms 
exercising market power may have to employ low-price policies in order to encourage rates of 
technological exposure and adoption that make the discounted value of the innovation positive and 
attractive to investors. The empirical study by Falck-Zepeda et al (2000) on markets for transgenic 
soybeans and cotton estimated that firms Monsanto and Delta & Pine Land (D&PL) adjust price to keep 
about 21% of the benefits generated from these innovations, while about 59% of these benefits flow to 
farmers, despite essential monopoly power by Monsanto and D&PL. A follow-up study by Oehmke and 
Wolf (2004) estimated heterogeneity in technology adopters to account for 80% of farmer rents. Although 
the question has yet to be addressed seriously, it appears that if “degraded” lands are favored for biofuels 
production due to low carbon release upon cultivation, their heterogeneity could well reduce the speed of 
technology adoption, thus reducing monopoly rents and perhaps investment in optimizing the technology.  
                                                 





  When the newest technology is a substitute for their current technology, farmers will not adopt the 
new technology unless the net benefits of switching are positive, leading to an additional constraint on 
oligopoly pricing for the new technology (Pray and Fuglie, 2001). If the current rate of innovation is 
rapid, the loss of the option to wait and use an even better prospective technology may increase the cost 
of adopting the current best technology when the sunk costs of learning or complementary investment are 
significant. 
  A large body of research on heterogeneity and adoption demonstrates that a number of other factors 
moderate the profitability of adoption at a given time. While a full review is beyond the scope of this 
paper, we briefly provide a few examples to illustrate the diversity of this work. Studies such as those by 
David (1969), Feder (1980), and Ruttan (1977) discuss the influence of farm size (perhaps as a proxy for 
wealth or increased access to credit, information, or production inputs) on the rate of technology diffusion 
or level of individual adoption, for various types of technology and institutional frameworks (Feder, Just, 
and Zilberman 1985). The findings from a recent paper by Fernandez-Cornejo et al (2005) imply that 
small U.S. farms that supplement farm income with off-farm activities are more likely to adopt time-
saving technologies such as herbicide-tolerant crops or conservation tillage. Examples of research 
evaluating the effect of heterogeneity in land quality on adoption decisions include Caswell and 
Zilberman’s (1986) analysis of water-holding capacity and irrigation technology and Rahm and 
Huffman’s (1984) article relating soil quality to adoption of corn varieties. Recently, access to 
information and social capital have been highlighted as determinants of adoption of crop varieties such as 
hybrid corn and wheat, mechanical innovations such as tractors, and livestock technologies, to name a 
few (Skinner and Staiger, 2005; Matuschke et al, 2007; Abdulai and Huffman, 2005). Finally, a plethora 
of research discusses the role of risk and uncertainty associated with adopting new technologies. 
  Another important insight is that technologies that reduce input use per unit output may, via price 
effects, increase total input demand with respect to the efficiency-adjusted unit, as observed in studies of 
water or energy use in modern irrigation technology (Caswell and Zilberman, 1986). Thus, yield-





7.2 Policy implications 
  Given the heterogeneity of the myriad of moderating factors, the adoption of agricultural 
technologies over extensive geographic areas is enhanced by directed local efforts and adaptations 
(Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). Key decisions for government are whether and how to alleviate risks and 
high fixed costs associated with adoption. The relevance of risk is dependent upon farmer perceptions and 
the type of technology (for example, see Fernandez-Cornejo et al, 1994). The adoption of crop 
technologies is scale-neural in the sense that farmers can test the new crop on a small portion of land, thus 
reducing risk problems and allowing farmers to learn through use (Feder, 1982; Feder, Just, and 
Zilberman, 1985). This strategy might be less relevant for biofuels, if their introduction depends upon a 
large investment in local processing facilities. In this case, extra attention should be paid to spatially 
dispersed adaptive and evaluative research (Judd et al, 1986), and appropriate extension services, public 
or private. 
Agricultural extension systems are designed to provide farmers information about new 
technologies and thus facilitate technology transfer or adoption. Researchers have estimated high rates of 
return to extension work in the U.S. and have demonstrated that, provided there are attractive 
technologies awaiting adoption, contact between farmers and extension agents promotes technology 
adoption in some less developed countries (Huffman and Evenson, 2006; Abdulai and Huffman, 2005; 
Polson and Spencer, 1990).  
  In industries requiring high up-front investments in infrastructure or regulatory compliance, 
adoption may be retarded by lock-in of old technologies. In agricultural biotechnology, regulatory 
requirements for testing a new variety, and fragmented IP claims on inputs for a single new technology, 
create high costs of entry for followers once a leading innovation has become approved established. 
Private firms owning IP might raise their prices for access to proprietary technology after strategically 
pricing low to induce diffusion and dependence.
12
                                                 
12 For example, in the years before United States patents were generally published 18 months after 
application, Monsanto encouraged widespread use of their 35S promoter in plant transformation. The fact 





incorporated in regulatory standards, familiar from the literature in electronics and communications 
technology, although the connections between the relative literatures have not, as far as we are aware, 
been fully explored.   
  Note, however, that if farmers perceive a technology to be extremely attractive or to provide 
significant benefits, they will not only adopt at impressive rates but may also perform adaptive innovation 
themselves, regardless of the policy regime in place. A case in point is the exchange and development of 
unapproved genetically modified seeds by Gujarati farmers, and the success of these farmers’ opposition 
to federal attempts to destroy the unapproved standing crop (Pray et al, 2005). The case of “no-tillage” 
agriculture in the U.S., one of the prominent agricultural innovations in the late twentieth century, is also 
a striking example of users innovating and adopting in response to prices and practical environmental 
problems. The first no-till planting is credited to Kentucky grain grower Harry Young, an extension 
specialist who successfully applied his knowledge of scientific trials for new herbicides to develop this 
new method of crop growing in 1962 (Coughenour and Chamala, 2001). Due to such benefits as 
increased yield and reduced requirements for labor, water, fuel, and machinery, the word about no-tillage 
spread rapidly between farmers, who traveled from neighboring states to learn about Young’s technique. 
The ensuing years saw rapid diffusion of the technique between farmers,
13
8. Conclusion 
 who adapted the technology 
for other crops such as soybeans. In view of the many complex legal and institutional innovation systems 
developed by governments, these examples are important reminders of the time-honored role of 
practitioners participating in technological development, with motivations ranging from necessity to 
curiosity. 
                                                                                                                                                             
that Monsanto had a patent on the technology was revealed only after 35S had been diffused widely, 
when the patent was granted and published. Innovators could commercialize their technologies 
incorporating the promoter only if they had a license from Monsanto, since switching promoters would 
have required producing new transgenic technologies using a non-infringing promoter, followed by 
transformation of relevant cultivars, testing, and dissemination (Joly and de Looze, 1996), an alternative 
so time-consuming as to preclude serious consideration. 
13 By 1970, 35% of farmers in southwest Kentucky had tried no-tillage for corn (Coughenour and 





In both the energy and the agricultural sectors, the demand for the services and goods produced 
extends across all the populated areas of the world, where heterogeneity in consumer preferences, 
environmental conditions, economic structures and governmental policies mediate the applicability and 
appropriateness of innovations. For agriculture, the need for local adaptive technology has created global 
dispersion of research efforts and support. However, investments are by no means evenly dispersed  
across the globe. Instead, the majority of global spending comes from large countries that can internalize 
the benefits of research. The high rates of return to agricultural research in the United States were 
achieved through sustained public investment oriented by a clear mission. The establishment of 
institutional mechanisms in the 19th Century created a public commitment to agriculture, but the extent 
and direction of public investments has been and will continue to be influenced by interest groups 
operating at multiple geographic scales.  
The experience in agriculture should be of interest to those assessing the appropriate roles of 
public and private research. In agriculture, (1) IPRs have not strongly encouraged the private production 
of basic, essential research that is risky and often only pays off in the long run, (2) IPRs on key research 
inputs can impede freedom to operate in public research, and (3) IPRs on research inputs have led to 
market concentration and price markups, which should discourage or delay adoption. However it appears 
that leading firms in the private sector have been particularly efficient in developing, promoting and 
disseminating commercial technology packages, relative to what one might reasonably expect of a 
typically competent public or non-profit entity, especially in the context of a disruptive and controversial 
technology. 
For governments, experience in agriculture illustrates the importance of effective consumer 
protection, administration of standards and grades, and antitrust. With respect to innovations, 
governments face the challenge of balancing public trust and safety with exploiting the advantages 
produced by a changing technological environment. Critiques of the shortcomings of regulatory 
performance in the United States and elsewhere draw attention to the need for further scientific study 







Table 1: Estimated global public and private agricultural R&D investments, 2000   
         Agricultural R&D spending     Shares in global total 
      (million 2000 intl. dollars)    (%) 
      1981  2000    1981  2000 
               
Public                   
  Asia and Pacific (28)  3047  7523    20.0  32.7 
  Latin America and Caribbean (27)  1897  2454    12.5  10.8 
  Sub-Saharan Africa (44)  1196  1461    7.9  6.3 
  West Asia and North Africa (18)  764  1382    5.0  6.0 
  Subtotal, less developed countries 
(117) 
6904  12819    45.4  55.8 
  USA    2533  3828    16.7  16.6 
  Subtotal, High Income Countries 
(22) 
8293  10191    54.6  44.2 
  Total (139)    15197  23010    100.0  100.0 
Private             
  Developing    -  869    -  6.5 
  High Income    -  12577    -  93.5 
  Total    -  13446    -  100.0 
Public and private             
  Developing    -  13688    -  37.5 
  High Income  -  22767    -  62.5 
Total     -  36456     -  100.0 
Source: Pardey et al. (2006a)           
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Source: Source data from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Available 
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In both sectors, the spatial effects will be important. The geographic distribution of agricultural 
production will necessarily respond to climate change, and important activities such as milk and meat 
production and land clearing might be highly constrained by regulations to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions. (Mendelsohn et al, 1994; Fisher and Hanemann,  1998). The spatial distribution of important 
types of energy usage are also likely to respond to climate change, and local, national and international 
regulations aimed at mitigating greenhouse gases and other environmental effects are already affecting the 
allocation of productive investment.   
 